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THE I.R.S. AND THE SECRET AGENT
MARY B. CooK*

Although secret agents have historically played a role in law enforcement,'
an increasing number of novel undercover operations, such as Abscam, 2 have
recently sparked public interest. Of primary concern is what specific circumstances warrant the use of undercover government agents for the detection of
crime.3 An Internal Revenue Service (IRS) "sting" operation, the Business
Opportunities Project (BOP),4 is among the undercover activities receiving
close scrutiny.5
In a BOP operation, IRS special agents pose as prospective purchasers of
businesses for sale in an effort to obtain evidence of tax fraud. In this undercover capacity, the agents gain the sellers' confidence, and then secure access
to company records to search for "skimming," the understatement of income,
*A.B., Brown University, 1969; A.M., University of Michigan, 1970; A.M.L.S., University
of Michigan, 1971; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1977. Assistant Professor of Law,
California Western School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ian M. Comisky.
1. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
2. Abscam is the code name for the FBI's "sting" operation aimed at determining
whether public officials would commit bribery offenses. E.g., United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d
823, 826 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Lederer v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983).
3. See Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Undercover
Work, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165 .(1982); Moore, Tax Lawyers Fear Use of Sting Tactics, Legal
Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 1; Jackson, Hunts for Tax Cheats Stirs Criticism, Los Angeles Times,
Mar. 18, 1982, at 1. The ongoing debate over the proper use of secret agents and covert investigation tactics has been reflected in the media; see, e.g., Maitland, At the Heart of the
Abscam Debate, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, (Magazine), at 22; in Congress: see, e.g., FINAL
REPORT, SENATE SELEcT CoMm. TO STUDY UNDERCOVER AcTIvmiEs OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEPT.
OF JUsTIcE, S. REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT];

and in the courts: see generally United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v.
Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.C.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
264 (1983); United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d 603
(2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Lederer v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983); United States v.
Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
4. See United States v. Security Bank of Nevada, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9588 (D.
Nev. 1982), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 82-4468 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1982); Jones v. Berry, 524
F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1981), rev'd, 722 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3820 (U.S. May 15, 1984) (No. 83-1216); Silver, IRS "Sting" Tactics Under Attack in the
Courts, 60 TAxEs 650 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 3, at 1; Robinson, The IRS Sharpens Its Sting, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
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by the sellers.0 This operation has recently been challenged as unconstitutional
by taxpayers caught in its "sting."
This article examines whether the Constitution places constraints on
undercover operations such as the Business Opportunities Project. Part I of
this article discusses those cases which have examined the propriety of the
BOP.7 Part II explores fourth amendment challenges to searches by secret
agents and the related doctrine of consent searches. Part III examines fifth
amendment due process limitations on undercover operations and surveys
various due process challenges, such as the recent Abscam cases. Part IV applies
these doctrines to the BOP and suggests the IRS undercover operations probably do not violate a taxpayer's fourth or fifth amendment rights. In addition,
Part IV recommends appropriate safeguards for IRS undercover operations.
This article concludes that the IRS, prior to going undercover in a legitimate
business, should meet a statutory threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion that the undercover operation will detect tax evasion.
I. CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES PROJECT

The first case to challenge the propriety of the Business Opportunities
Project was Jones v. Berry.s In Jones, the federal district court vividly described the "orchestrated ruse" employed by the IRS. 9 The BOP operation
was initiated in January 1981 when IRS Special Agent Manning informed a
sales representative that he and a partner were interested in purchasing a
business with a "substantial cash flow susceptible to skimming." Without
mentioning whether skimming was actually occurring, the sales representative
replied that he had a company listed which might fit Manning's purposes. 10
The sales representative later revealed the business was Acme Meat Company,
owned by William and Gladys Jones.
Following this disclosure, Manning toured the business premises of Acme
Meat and raised the subject of skimming with Mr. Jones. Although the conversation was couched in vague terms, Manning deduced Jones was skimming.
Several days later, the sales representative asked Manning if he was with the
IRS. In response, Manning laughed and said nothing."
Additional meetings then took place at the Joneses' home. On April 4,
1981, Manning reviewed corporate books and records at the Joneses' residence.
On April 25, Special Agent Mason posing as Manning's business partner also
met with the Joneses.' 2 The agents stated they were only interested in acquir6. Jones v. Berry, 524 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D. Ariz. 1981), rev'd, 722 F.2d 443 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. May 15, 1984) (No. 83-1216).
7. United States v. Security Bank of Nevada, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9588 (D. Nev.
1982), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 82-4468 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1982); Jones v. Berry, 524
F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1981), rev'd, 722 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3820 (U.S. May 15, 1984) (No. 83-1216).
8. 524 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1981).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 647.
11. Id. at 648.

12. Id. While Manning feigned interest in buying the business, Mason feigned reluctance.
The court called this technique a "good guy-bad guy" approach:
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ing a business which could generate skimming, and Mr. Jones agreed to show
them the skimmed records. While at the Joneses' residence, the agents noted
a "For Sale" sign and, on the pretext of knowing a potential buyer, the agents
toured the home. The actual purpose of the tour was to prepare a diagram for
a search warrant.' 3
A few days later pursuant to a search warrant the Joneses' residence was
searched, 14 and a number of records were seized.' 5 The Joneses subsequently
filed a petition in federal district court seeking suppression and return of the
seized records.'0 The court concluded the April 4 and April 25 meetings
organized by the agents constituted searches in violation of the fourth amend-

Agent Manning was the "good guy" who would appear to be anxious to close the deal,
while his "partner" agent Mason would be hesitant and insist on further documentation of the skim. This approach has the effect of encouraging the sellers to think that
one of the partners is on their side and thus they will receive their asking price if
only they can convince the "bad guy" of the true amount of the skim. Under these
circumstances the sellers are more likely to produce the best available documentation
of the skim, documentation that also will be the most damaging evidence in a later
prosecution for tax fraud.
Id. at 650.
13. Id. at 648.
14. Id. The search began when two agents announced to Mrs. Jones they were real
estate agents and wished to look at the house. Once inside, they displayed their badges and
announced they were executing a search warrant. Id.
15. Id. at 649. Eight boxes of records were seized from the Joneses' current residence,
and eight boxes were seized from their new residence. Id.
16. Id. Their petition was filed pursuant to FED. R. Cams. P. 41(e), which reads, in part:
(e) Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact
necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall
be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the petition and permanently enjoined the
IRS from using the suppressed evidence in any criminal proceeding. 524 F. Supp. at 655.
This decision was later reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 722 F.2d 443 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. May 15, 1984) (No. 83-1216).
Because the district court in Jones confined the operation of its suppression order to
criminal proceedings, the question arises as to whether the IRS can properly use such evidence
in a civil proceeding. In Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980),
the evidence had been suppressed in a related criminal proceeding because Vander Linden's
consent to the production of the records had been fraudulently induced through misrepresentation of the true nature of the audit. Id. at 695-96. The court concluded the IRS could
not properly use the suppressed evidence as the basis for tax assessments and civil fraud
penalties. Distinguishing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), which allowed evidence
suppressed in a state court proceeding to be used in federal court, the Vander Linden court
noted, "this is not only an intrasovereign situation but is actually the same division of the
IRS that committed the illegal search and seizure [that is] now seeking to utilize evidence obtained by the illegal search and seizure." Vander Linden, 502 F. Supp. at 697. Although the
court suppressed the evidence in question, the court indicated the tax assessment could nevertheless proceed if other evidence existed to support it, Id, at 698.
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ment. 1 7 Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 8 the two illegal

warrantless searches tainted the May 1 search and seizure. As a result, the
court ordered all the property seized under the warrant suppressed and returned to the Joneses.19
In assessing the legality of the April 4 and April 25 searches, the court first
referred to cases upholding the reasonableness of warrantless searches involving deception by undercover agents, such as in the detection of contraband.2 0
The court, however, rejected the application of such cases to this IRS operation. In the court's view, transactions involving contraband, unlike noncompliance with tax laws, pose a risk to the health and safety of society. Additionally, the contraband suspect has no legitimate property or business interest,
whereas the taxpayer has a legitimate interest in marketing his business. 2'
The court was thus concerned with both the propriety of using undercover
agents for the enforcement of tax laws and the placement of such agents in
legitimate business settings. Clearly, individuals engaged in legitimate occupations are obligated to submit income tax returns and to cooperate with IRS
audits. They need not, however, be subjected to honesty tests administered by
IRS undercover agents, nor should they have to endure the intrusiveness of
a government agent's pretextual business negotiations.
Undoubtedly, certain individuals do evade paying income tax by skimming
from a legitimate business. 'Whenever IRS undercover agents make random
contact with persons selling businesses, though, the possibility exists of invading the privacy of an honest business person. This latter situation illustrates
the most troubling aspect of the BOP. In Jones, for example, the agents only
suspected there might be skimming. The sales representative who directed
them to the Joneses' business never mentioned skimming was actually occurring there.
After distinguishing the undercover operations involved in contraband
cases, the Jones court next ruled that case law pertaining to IRS searches,
17. 524 F. Supp. at 652. The court flatly rejected the IRS' contention that the April 4
and April 25 meetings were not searches because the agents were mere "receivers of information." Id. at 651.
18. This doctrine provides that evidence derived from information acquired through
unlawful means is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. Such evidence is considered
tainted fruit of the poisonous tree. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.04, at 30

(1980).
19. 524 F. Supp. at 655. Although the court clearly based its order on the conclusion
that the May I searches were tainted by the conduct of the agents on April 4 and April 25,
it nevertheless offered alternative holdings. With respect to the search of the Joneses' current

home, the court found the seizure exceeded the specific limits of the warrant. Thus, had the
search and seizure of their current residence not been tainted by the prior illegal searches,
the Joneses would have been entitled to the return of those records not within the scope of
the warrant. With respect to their new home, the Joneses successfully argued that consent to

the search was revoked by their demands for return of the records. Id. at 654.
20. Id. at 650-51. The court cited Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), for the
proposition that the reasonableness of warrantless searches during undercover operations

turns on the circumstances of each case, and later cited United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), and United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976), as examples of contraband
cases.
21. 524 F. Supp. at 651.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss5/1

4

Cook: The I.R.S. and the Secret Agent
1983]

IRS AND SECRET AGENTS

rather than FBI searches, applies in detecting fourth amendment violations.22
In United States v. Tweel,23 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suppressed
records obtained in a consent search because of an IRS agent's silent misrepresentations.24 In response to an inquiry whether a "special agent" was involved,
the revenue agent answered no. Normally, the involvement of a special agent
signals an investigation with criminal overtones. 25 Although a special agent
was not involved, the revenue agent's reply still misled Tweel as the audit was
in fact a criminal investigation. The court found the failure to identify the
criminal nature of the investigation a silent misrepresentation and declared
the consent search invalid under the fourth amendment. 6 Even though Tweel
did not involve an undercover operation, the Jones court still found its conclusion applicable to the BOP undercover operation.27
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, 28 concluding the
Joneses had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information they revealed to the undercover agents. 29 Thus, the IRS activities did not constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.2 0 According to the
court, "the fourth amendment affords no protection to a 'wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it.'-"1 Furthermore, this "misplaced confidence" doctrine is
applicable to IRS undercover activities. 2 Despite finding no fourth amendment violation, the court nevertheless declined to condone the tactics of the
IRS agents.2 2
While the Jones district court found the BOP methods constitutionally
defective and the Ninth Circuit found them troubling, the court in United
22. Id. at 652.
23. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 299.
25. Whereas a revenue agent may simply be conducting a routine audit, a special agent
is primarily concerned with detecting fraud and recommending criminal charges. H. BALTER,
TAX FRAUD AND EVASION § 3.04(2)(a), at 3-13 (5th ed. 1983).
26. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d at 299, citing United States v. Rothstein, 530 F.2d
1275 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971); cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); United States v.
Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Prudden,
424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
27. 524 F. Supp. at 651.
28. Jones v. Berry, 722 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S.
May 15, 1984) (No. 83-1216).
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 585 U.S. 206 (1966).
30. 722 F.2d at 448.
31. Id. at 447, quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
32. 722 F.2d at 447.
33. The court commented: "Democratic governments are based on a relationship o trust
between government and the governed. If the possibility exists that the next acquaintance
one makes may be a government agent conducting a hidden investigation unjustified by any
indication of wrongdoing, every relationship will be tainted by suspicion and fear." Id. at
448. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's alternative conclusion that the
evidence seized at the Joneses' new residence should be suppressed because consent to the
search was revoked. The court stated that revocation of consent would have been effective
only if it had occurred before completion of the search. Id. at 448-49.
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States v. Securzty Bank of Nevada3 4 viewed the BOP differently. The undercover operation began when letters from a supposed investment company were
sent to businesses for sale, including two brothels owned by the Gammels.
After receiving a response from Mrs. Gammel, IRS undercover agents posing
as interested buyers visited her. 35 Their decision to investigate further was
based on "something" Mrs. Gammel said at this initial meeting. 36 Before this
meeting, however, the agents had no reason to suspect she was skimming.
The subsequent investigation included several personal meetings, telephone
contacts, and electronic surveillance. In the course of the investigation, Mrs.
Gammel apparently made statements suggesting the business made more than
the books reflected. 37 The IRS thereafter revealed their investigation to Mrs.
Gammel, and proceeded to serve six third-party summonses for the examination of records. Among those parties served were the Gammels' accountant and
various local banks and savings associations."s Next, the IRS petitioned the
district court for enforcement of the summonses. The Gammels intervened
and contended the BOP investigation violated their fourth amendment rights,
thereby tainting the otherwise proper summonses.3 9
The court reviewed the Jones district court analysis and rejected the distinction between tax cases and contraband cases. Unlike the Jones court's
position that taxpayer noncompliance does not threaten public welfare, the
Security Bank court emphasized the substantial public interest in the full
reporting of income and the great cost to the public resulting from tax evasion.
The Security Bank court stated taxpayers have no legitimate interest in "selling
the skim" as an asset of their business. While recognizing the problems associated with sting operations, the court accepted the validity of such operations
in situations where the government has no other method of discovering in40
formation.
The court stopped short of basing a decision on its apparent approval of
the BOP methods. Instead, the court emphasized that the third party summonses requested no records in which the Gammels had a privilege or a
protected right to privacy. Thus, the court enforced the summonses, but left
open the possibility of hearing constitutional challenges to the BOP if the
taxpayers later faced criminal prosecution. 4' While declining to rule directly
34. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9588 (D. Nev. 1982), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 824468 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1982).
35. Id. at 85,115-16.
36. Id. at 85,116.
37. Id. The court reached this conclusion after an in camera inspection of the agents'
tapes and reports. Id.
38. The IRS' summons power is provided by I.R.C. § 7602 (1982) (this provision was
revised in 1982).
39. Security Bank, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9588, at 85,119-20.
40. Id. at 85,119.
41. Id. at 85,120. The Gammels also argued that the investigation was for criminal rather
than civil purposes. Under United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978), the IRS,
in order to use the summonses, could not have abandoned the pursuit of civil tax determination. The Security Bank court found that since the Gammel investigation was still in its very
early stages, it might have both civil and criminal purposes simultaneously. Thus, the
summonses were enforced.
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on the propriety of the BOP methods, the court, in contrast to the Jones

district court, certainly appeared in dictum to sanction the IRS undercover
tactics. Moreover, the court allowed the investigation to continue. In order to
determine whether such tactics are indeed constitutionally permissible, it is
necessary to examine whether limits placed on government investigative
techniques in other settings should apply to the IRS.
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO UNDERCOVER SEARCHES

The fourth amendment restricts governmental search and seizure procedures. This part of the article first examines the pertinent fourth amendment doctrines established by the Supreme Court, and concludes that these
principles, if applicable to the IRS, sanction the BOP. The article next examines fourth amendment cases involving the IRS, and determines that the
general Supreme Court precepts do apply to the IRS. Thus, the BOP appears
constitutionally acceptable from a fourth amendment perspective.
A. The Supreme Court
Only once has the Supreme Court found that a search by an undercover
agent violated the fourth amendment. In Gouled v. United States,42 an Army
Intelligence Department private who was a business acquaintance of Gouled
The requirement of a civil purpose for the summons has been eliminated by the 1982
version of I.R.C. § 7602(b). The Joint Committee on Taxation explained the change:
Many tax investigations by the Internal Revenue Service have both civil and criminal aspects. Congress believed that a clear definition of when the power to issue an
administrative summons exists and when it does not exist in cases with a criminal
aspect would simplify administration of the laws without prejudicing the rights of
taxpayers. Thus, the Act establishes a mechanical test for determining when the power
to issue a summons ceases to exist. To permit the drawing of a dear distinction, it
was necessary to expand the purposes for which an administrative summons may be
issued by the Internal Revenue Service.
Under prior law, the use of administrative summonses was limited to the determination and collection of taxes. The Act expands this authority to include the right to
issue a summons for the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws, even when the criminal
investigation is the sole investigation.
General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., Pub. L. No. 97-248, at 285-36 (1982).
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit granted appellants motion to dismiss the appeal as moot
and remanded the case to the district court for vacation of the order appealed from. United
States v. Security Bank of Nevada, No. 82-4468 (9th Cir. 1982). In its order dismissing the
appeal, the court cited United States v. Silva & Silva Accountancy Corp., 641 F.2d 710 (9th
Cir. 1981). In Silva, the IRS had applied to the district court for an order enforcing a sum-

mons, and the taxpayers intervened. The district court ordered the summons enforced and
denied the tixpayers' motion for a'stay pending appeal. Silva then complied with the summons, and the appeal was dismissed as moot because the summons appealed from had been
fully satisfied. Id. at 711.
42.

225 US. 298 (1921).
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feigned a friendly visit, and then searched Gouled's office in his absence. 43 The
Court stated:
[W] hether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of crime
be obtained by a representative of any branch or subdivision of the Government of the United States by stealth, or through social acquaintance,
or in the guise of a business call, and whether the owner be present or
not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently and secretly
made in his absence falls within the scope of the prohibition of the
44
Fourth Amendment.
The Court later characterized Gouled as a case involving extreme circum45
stances, and confined its authority to the precise facts.
The Court again examined the propriety of an undercover agent's search
in On Lee v. United States."6 In that case, the undercover agent was a former
employee and acquaintance of On Lee. The agent, having been electronically
wired for sound, entered Oil Lee's laundry and conversed with him. Outside,
an agent of the Narcotics Bureau heard incriminating statements made by
On Lee.47 At trial, the Narcotics Bureau agent testified about the statements
he overheard. The Court affirmed On Lee's drug conviction, finding no violation of the fourth amendment. The Court concluded the agent did not commit a trespass because he entered the laundry with On Lee's consent; the
agent's fraud in obtaining entry did not negate the consent. 4s The Court
49
distinguished Gouled because in this case no tangible evidence was seized.
Unlike Gouled, the On Lee petitioner was simply talking confidentially and
indiscretely with someone he trusted, and he was overheard.50
Measured by the constitutional guidelines established in Gouled and On
Lee, the BOP methods did not violate the fourth amendment. In Jones and
Security Bank, the IRS undercover agents used deception to gain entry into
the taxpayers' premises, but they did not conduct secret searches and seizures
of the type condemned in Gouled. The agents, in posing as prospective purchasers of businesses, misrepresented their identities and purpose in gaining
entry to the taxpayers' premises, but nevertheless entered with the taxpayers'
consent. In addition, the agents confined their observations to matters voluntarily shown to them by the taxpayers. 51

43. Id. at 304. Gouled was suspected of conspiring to defraud the government in certain
contract matters.
44. Id. at 306.
45. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 346 (1967)).
46. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
47. Id. at 749.
48. Id. at 752.
49. Id. at 753. The Court noted that Olmstead "sharply limited" the authority of Gouled.
Id.
50. Id. at 753-54.
51. For example, the Joneses readily displayed their books and records, pulling invoices
from dresser drawers and papers from a file cabinet. In Security Bank, Mrs. Gammel invited
the agents to her accountant's office and, like On Lee, conversed indiscretely with the supposed investment counselors.
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The Court further refined the doctrine relating to undercover operations
in Lopez v. United States. 52 In contrast to the BOP cases, the IRS agent in
Lopez was not operating undercover. Instead the agent gave full notice of
his authority and purpose and asked to see Lopez's books. 53 Lopez responded
with talk about reaching an "agreement" and offered the agent $420. The
agent took the money and at a subsequent meeting with Lopez, secretly recorded their conversation. Lopez was subsequently convicted of attempted
bribery of the IRS agent. On appeal, he contended the agent gained access to
his office through misrepresentation and thus the tape recordings were illegally
seized.5 4 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that Lopez consented to
the visit and, unlike Gouled, the agent did not "violate the privacy of the
office by seizing something surreptitiously." 55 The agent's mere pretense of
accepting a bribe did not violate Lopez's fourth amendment rights.
Although Lopez did not involve an undercover operation, the Court nevertheless expounded on the inherent risk one necessarily assumes in being "deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals." 56 Thus, in the BOP
cases, the Joneses and the Gammels assumed the risk that the prospective purchasers of their businesses were deceiving them with respect to their identity.
In Lewis v. United States,57 the Court again found no fourth amendment
violation occurred when an undercover agent misrepresented his identity to
gain evidence of criminal activity. The agent, identifying himself as "Jimmy
the Pollack," telephoned Lewis asking to buy marijuana. Lewis invited
"Jimmy" to his home where he sold him the drugs. Convicted of violating the
narcotics laws, Lewis argued on appeal that he did not waive his fourth amend-

ment rights by inviting the agent into his home because the invitation was
induced by the agent's deception. 58 The Court rejected this argument, concluding that if this agent's actions were constitutionally prohibited, then
virtually any use of undercover agents would be unconstitutional per se.59
That the drug sales were conducted in Lewis' home did not change the result
because Lewis had used his home as a "commercial center" for illegal transactions. The Court referred to Gouled to negate the idea that an agent, once

invited inside, might be entitled to conduct a general search. An agent may
accept an individual's invitation to enter the premises but only for those
purposes contemplated by the occupant.60
52. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
53. Id. at 441.
54. Id. at 437.
55. Id. at 438.

56. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
58. Id. at 208.
59. Id. at 210.
60. Id. at 211. On the same day it decided Lewis, the Court also decided Hoffa v. United
States. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). In Hoffa, the Court determined that a government informer's
failure to identify himself as such did not vitiate the defendant's consent to his presence in a
hotel room. Hoffa "was not relying on the security of the hotel room ....
[but] upon his
misplaced confidence that [the informer] would not reveal his wxongdoing."'id. at 302. In
comparison, the Joneses and the Gammels likewise misplaced their confidence in the
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In comparing Lewis to the BOP cases, many similarities can be seen. Just
as the undercover agent in Lewis misrepresented his identity, the IRS agents
in the BOP cases falsely identified themselves as prospective purchasers of
businesses. In addition, despite the IRS agents' supposed interest in buying
legitimate businesses, they likewise expressed a desire to participate in an
illegal activity - skimming cash. Regarding the location of the transactions,
Lewis invited the agent to his home to buy drugs, and the Joneses invited the
IRS agents to their home to view their books and records. Although the
records were not illegal like contraband, they did document an illegal activity.
Because the Joneses maintained the records in their residence, it could also be
considered a "commercial center." Thus, the IRS agents' tour of the Joneses'
residence and examination of documents does not alter the fourth amendment analysis. Finally, because the agents' activities in the house were for the
very purposes contemplated by the Joneses, the agents remained within the
limits established by Gouled.
Soon after Lewis, the Court stated in Katz v. United States6 that the fourth
amendment's protection no longer depends on whether a physical intrusion or
trespass has occurred, but instead centers on whether the individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.6 2 The Court later determined, though, that
Katz did not alter the doctrine relating to undercover searches. In United
States v. White, 63 the Couri upheld the use of electronic recording devices by
a government informant. The Court stated a defendant does not have a constitutionally protected right that someone with whom he is conversing will not
6
reveal the conversation to the proper authorities. 4
From On Lee to White, the Supreme Court has confirmed that an undercover agent may misrepresent or fail to disclose his identity to a taxpayer in
order to obtain an invitation or consent to entry. Thereafter, the agent can
gather evidence of criminal activity, untouched by the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment.6 5 Gouled merely requires that the agent not exceed the
scope of the consent or the purpose for which he was invited.
prospective purchasers of their businesses not revealing their incriminating statements and
records.
61. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353; Katz's conviction for transmitting wagering information was reversed
62.
after the Court excluded evidence of telephone conversations overheard by FBI agents via an
electronic listening device. The electronic listening and recording viloated Katz's privacy and,
therefore, was a warrantless search and seizure. Id. at 359; see Warner, Governmental Deception in Consent Searches, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 57, 64 (1979).
63. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
64. Id. at 749.
65. One commentator summarizes this doctrine as such:
[W]hen an individual gives consent to another to intrude into an area or activity otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware that he will thereby reveal to this
other person either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct, the consent is not
vitiated merely because it would would not have been given but for the nondisclosure
or affirmative misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other
person's identity as a police officer or police agent.
2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

§

8.2, at 680 (1978). However, another commentator states:
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In Jones and Security Bank, the actions of the IRS agents comported with

the constraints enunciated by the Supreme Court. Although the agents encouraged the taxpayers to reveal their skimming, no documents were sur-

reptitiously seized. Rather, the taxpayers voluntarily revealed their business
records to the agents after escorting them through their premises. The Joneses
and Gammels simply misplaced their confidence that the agents would not
reveal their wrongdoing. Thus, upon applying the Supreme Court standards
to the BOP, it is evident the IRS agents' undercover activities fall outside the
protection of the fourth amendment.
B. The IRS and the Fourth Amendment
In United States v. Ward, 6 the Tenth Circuit applied Lewis to assess the

propriety of an IRS undercover investigation of gambling activities. 7 Ward,
therefore, runs counter to the Jones district court's notion that cases such as
Lewis which involve FBI undercover operations do not apply to IRS searches.
The undercover operation in Ward may be distinguishable from the BOP
cases, though, in that Ward involved infiltration of an illegal enterprise,
gambling, while the BOP cases focused on legitimate businesses. Of course,

The concept of consent implies a decision by the individual to allow government
officers to search his person, property, or possessions. What we are dealing with here,
however, is not consent at all but, rather, a mere failure to object because the individual has been deceived by government itself about the most basic fact of all-that
a search is about to occur. This sort of deception, no less than duress, coercion, or
show of authority, is basically incompatible with the notion of voluntary consent. The
consent theory is, in short, unpersuasive.
Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret
Agents, and Informers, 1976 A.B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 1195, 1260-61. Several other commentators have analyzed the doctrines enunciated in the undercover cases. See, e.g., Bergstrom, The
Applicability of the "New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. Rav.
785 (1970); Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. Ray. 203
(1975); Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994 (1967); Comment, Present
and Suggested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Eenforcement,
41 U. COLO. L. REV. 261 (1969).
Some commentators suggest that the constitutionality of such "consent by deception
should be confined to situations where the agent feigns participation in the criminal activity."
See W. LAFAvE, at 682; Warner, supra note 62, at 97. The lower courts, however, have not
confined themselves to this interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981) (undercover agent posed as Baldwin's
chauffeur and handyman); United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1977) (agent posed as a friend of a drug dealer who had already been
arrested); United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976) (undercover agent posed as
a "helper" to a printing press company repersentative).
66. 682 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 882. The IRS undercover agent had placed a wager with Ward. Thereafter, he
obtained a search warrant for Ward's residence. While executing the warrant, the agent
answered the telephone and induced an individual to deliver $3,290 to the residence. Id. at
878. The seizure of the $3,290 was challenged on the grounds that the agent, by using an
alias on the telephone, had acquired the money by deceit. Id. at 881.
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the BOP's aim is to uncover illegal skimming, an illegitimate activity of an
otherwise legitimate business.
At least one other court in addition to the Jones district court has voiced
concern over the placement of agents in legitimate businesses. In Rentex Corp.
v. Messinger,"s the Tenth 'Circuit expressed concern over the placement of
IRS undercover agents in legitimate businesses. In Rentex, an IRS undercover
agent obtained employment at Rentex Corporation after the IRS received
information that a principal officer kept a separate ledger or "skim book." 69
After working there for a month, the agent "quit," obtained a search warrant
and seized books and records.7 0 Rentex filed a civil action seeking to enjoin
the use of the documents in any criminal proceeding71 The court found the
claim "premature" in a civil action. 7 2 Significantly the court stated, "[t]his
opinion should not be taken in any way as an approval or disapproval of the
use of undercover agents in legitimate businesses. Quite different considerations are there present which are not present in the drug cases, and we have
not evaluated them. 7 3 Thus, Rentex raises the question as to whether IRS
undercover activity should be governed by the standards enunciated in the
Supreme Court undercover cases.
In taking the position that a fourth amendment analysis of IRS undercover operations is different from a fourth amendment analysis of FBI under74
cover operations, the Jones court mistakenly relied on United States v. Twee1
for support. Tweel and the other IRS cases exemplify the application of
traditional doctrines relating to consent searches by any type of government
agent. These cases illustrate that IRS searches are subject to the same fourth
amendment analysis as those of other law enforcement agencies.
Basically, a government agent may conduct a warrantless search and seizure
if the individual subject to the search voluntarily consents.7 5 Problems typically
arise because an IRS investigation may be a hybrid civil-criminal investigation.76 A taxpayer may choose to volunteer records in a routine civil audit, but
he may not be as cooperative in a criminal investigation. 77 In other words, if
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
charges
73.

570 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id. The court stated the proper remedy would be a motion to suppress after criminal
ensued. Id.
Id.

74. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
75. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). "Voluntariness" is based on the
totality of circumstances. Id. at 223. A "knowing and intelligent" waiver of constitutional
rights is not required for the consent to be voluntary. Id. at 241.
76. United States v. Irvine, 699 F.2d 43, 44 (Ist Cir. 1983).
77. This could be viewed as an instance where the taxpayer limits the scope of his consent to a "civil" search. One commentator explained how a consenting individual may place
limits on a warrantless consent search:
Even if
person was
follow that
are relying

it is determined that the consent of the defendant or another authorized
"voluntary" within the meaning of Schneckloth, it does not necessarily
evidence found in an ensuing search will be admissible. When the police
upon consent as the basis for their warrantless search, they have no more
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a taxpayer is aware that the IRS investigation may eventually result in criminal prosecution, he may not consent to the audit investigation. The IRS is
then required to utilize its more formal methods of information-gathering.7 8
The IRS cases revolve around the issue of whether an IRS agent must reveal the criminal aspects of the investigation for the taxpayer's consent to be
effective. In several cases decided before Tweet, the courts declined to suppress
evidence unless IRS agents made affirmative misrepresentations. The mere
failure to inform taxpayers of the criminal nature of the investigation would
not invalidate consent searches. 79 Tweel did not alter the applicable doctrine;
rather, the Court there found the requisite affirmative misrepresentation to
justify the suppression of evidence.80
authority than they have been given by the consent. It is thus important to take
account of any express or implied limitations or qualifications attending that consent
which establish the permissible scope of the search in terms of such matters as time,
duration, area, or intensity.
W. LAFAvE, supra note 65, § 8.1, at 624.
78. See generally H. BALTER, supra note 25, at § 5.02.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Rothstein, 580 F.2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1826, 1829 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 18,
18 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 967 (1978); United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1, 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
834 (1972); United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 775-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
842 (1972); United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 948 (1970); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970).
In Prudden, for example, a revenue agent began an audit of a corporation of which
Prudden was a director. After finding indications of fraud, the agent broadened the investigation to cover Prudden's personal returns. 424 F.2d at 10-22-28. In accordance with
routine IRS procedures, the revenue agent made a referral report to the Intelligence Division
of the IRS, which then decided to make a "full-scale investigation." Id. at 1028-24. On the
followup investigation, a different revenue agent was assigned. Prudden was informed of the
change, but was not told that Special Agent Cohen from the Intelligence Division was now
in charge of the investigation. At a subsequent meeting with Prudden, Cohen attended and
identified himself as a special agent. Neither the revenue agent nor the special agent, though,
ever stated that a criminal investigation was being conducted. Id. at 1024-25.
The trial court suppressed all the evidence gathered after the referral of the case to the
Intelligence Division, finding that "the Internal Revenue Service agents engaged in a deliberate scheme to deceive Prudden in order to prevent his suspecting that the nature of the
investigation had altered materially." Id. at 1081. The appellate court reversed the suppression order, rejecting the trial court's finding that Prudden's consent to examine the records
was obtained by fraud, deceit, and trickery. The appellate court stated:
All Cohen was required to do by the then existing Internal Revenue Service requirements was to tell Prudden that he was a Special Agent and show Prudden his
credentials. This he did. He in no way concealed his true identity. He could not have
affirmatively misled Prudden as to the function of the Intelligence Division or as to
the duties of a special agent, since neither of these subjects were ever discussed. Silence
can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where
an inquiry left unanswered whould be intentionally misleading.
Id. at 1082.
80. Cases decided after Tweel clearly indicate that most courts still require an affirma-
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When individuals knowingly deal with IRS agents, they should be able to
rely on the truth of the agents' representations before agreeing to cooperate.
These situations, however, are clearly different from undercover operations.
Each scenario is governed by a different line of cases, representing two very
different applications of fourth amendment doctrine. The former are governed by the "consent" cases, the latter, including the BOP, by the "undercover" cases. Unlike the consent cases, the undercover cases exhibit no concern
with the government agents' misrepresentations of their identities. Although
the use of undercover agents for investigating legitimate businesses may seem
intrusive, the established Supreme Court doctrines indicate the BOP poses no
fourth amendment problems.
III. FIFTH AIENDMENT DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
TO UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

Although courts have analyzed the BOP on fourth amendment grounds,
another source of constitutional authority may limit government investigative
tactics. Due process principles prohibit investigative methods that offend a
sense of justice or shock the conscience. 81 Recognizing that the concept of due
process has vague and indefinite contours, the Supreme Court in Rochin v.
California,s2 described due process of law as "an exercise of judgment [resulting in a conviction] upon the whole course of the proceedings in order to
ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice.".13 The Rochin standard has often been invoked
in undercover cases which involve an entrapment defense.
tive misrepresentation before finding the taxpayer's consent is vitiated. E.g., United States v.
Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1983) ("does not amount to affirmative deceit unless defendant inquired about the nature of the investigation and the agent's failure to respond was
intended to mislead."); United States v. Irvine, 699 F.2d 43, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1983); United
States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Toussaint,
456 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D. Tex. 1978). In Toussaint, the district court suppressed evidence
gathered by a revenue agent after he had discovered "firm indications of fraud." The court
concluded the agent's failure to refer the investigation promptly to the Intelligence Division
and to bring in a special agent resulted in deceiving Toussaint. Id. at 1074.
81. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
82. Id. at 165. The Supreme Court reversed Rochin's conviction because police officers
had broken into his room and, after observing him swallow two capsules, had struggled to
extract them. After failing to do so, the officers dragged him to a hospital and had his stomach
pumped. Id. at 166.
83. Id. at 169. The Rochin standard has been applied to other cases involving bodily
invasion with varying results. Whereas the police methods in Rochin were termed brutal
and offensive, the police-ordered extraction by a doctor of a blood sample from an unconscious person did not offend a sense of decency or fairness. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432 (1957). In contrast, the internal examination of a pregnant woman by two nonmedical
policewomen was considered a violation of the due process clause, United States ex rel. Guy
v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974), as was forcing a male to submit to the
swabbing of his genitals in order to detect the presence of blood. United States v. Townsend,
151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
In any factual context, the governmental conduct must be extreme or coercive to rise to
the level of a due process violation. Thus, in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974), charges, if proven, that American agents violently kidnapped, tortured, and
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A. Entrapment and Due Process
Entrapment occurs when the government officers initiate the criminal
design and the accused is by persuasion, misrepresentation, or inducement
lured into committing a crime.84 The early Supreme Court entrapment
opinions reflect concern over the rationale for the entrapment defense. In
Sorrells v. United States,85 a majority of the Court viewed the predisposition
and criminal design of the defendant as predominant.8 6 The majority's version
of the entrapment doctrine, termed the "subjective approach,"' 7 states that if
the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, the entrapment defense will
fail, even if government agents induced the commission of the crime. A minority of the Court focused on the conduct of the government agents, not the
predisposition or innocence of the defendant. This latter rationale, labeled the
"objective approach,"88 is based on public policy and recognizes that "courts
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own
agents." 89 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions reflect continuing disagreement
over the appropriate test, yet the subjective approach remains the governing
test in the federal courts.90
In addition to refining the federal entrapment doctrine, the Supreme Court
opinions elucidate acceptable law enforcement methods. Undercover operations have been held permissible and indeed necessary in certain contexts. In
United States v. Russell,91 an undercover agent supplied defendants with a
chemical which was a scarce and necessary ingredient for manufacturing
methamphetamines.p 2 Defendants were subsequently convicted of manufacturing and selling the drug. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds
that an undercover agent had supplied defendants with the necessary chemical
abducted defendant from another country in order to bring him into the United States to
face criminal charges would constitute a due process violation. However, the abduction and
transportation of a person into the United States, in the absence of violence or police
brutality, would not be a constitutional violation. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). See also Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and
the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REv. 567, 600-01 (1982).
84. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932).
85. Id. at 435. In Sorrells, an undercover prohibition agent visited defendant's home,
posed as a tourist. He repeatedly requested liquor, and defendant finally produced some. Id.
at 439. The agent's purpose was to prosecute defendant for procuring and selling liquor. Id.
at 440. The issue before the Court was whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury
on the issue of entrapment. The Court held that the trial court erred in not submitting the
issue to the jury. Id. at 452.
86. Id.at 451.
87. See, e.g., Edwards & Edwards, Entrapment in the Federal Courts; Variations on a
Theme, 8 OHio N.U.L. REv. 223, 226 (1981).
88. Id. at 247.
89. 287 U.S. at 459.
90. Several commentators have discussed the different versions of the entrapment doctrine.
See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 1; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts,
90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942); Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163
Constitutional Status of the
(1976); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat -The
EntrapmentDefense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965).

91. 411 U.S. 42a (1978).
92. Id. at 424.
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ingredients. 93 Before the Supreme Court, the defendants urged the adoption of
a constitutional rule precluding prosecution when the criminal offense was
made possible by an undercover agent's supplying " 'an indispensable means
to the commission of the crime that could not have been obtained otherwise,
through legal or illegal channels.' 94 The Court declined to adopt the rule
but recognized the possibility of a due process claim in other circumstances. 95
The Russell facts, however, did not present such outrageous conduct by the
undercover agents to warrant invoking due process principles to bar the conviction.
In Hampton v. United States,99 the Court in a plurality opinion again
found no due process violation when a government informer supplied defendant with heroin and arranged for its later sale to government agents. In a
concurring opinion, two Justices agreed that supplying contraband to one later
convicted for selling that contraband is not a per se denial of due process.
They emphasized, however, that there might be appropriate situations in
which a defendant, instead of relying solely on the defense of entrapment,
could seek protection under due process principles or the Court's supervisory
powers. 97 The three dissenting Justices agreed with this latter statement. 98
Thus a majority of the Hampton Court concluded that a due process claim
may be available in appropriate cases. The concurrence cautioned, however,
that overinvolvement by the police would have to be demonstrably outrageous
before it could bar conviction. 99
Whether the Business Opportunities Project falls within these due process
limitations is unclear. Unlike the contraband cases, the BOP does not involve
the instigation of tax evasion or the manufacturing of tax offenses. Instead,
the BOP is aimed at detecting an illegality already practiced by taxpayers. On
this ground, one might conclude the BOP methodology is acceptable because
IRS agents cannot conceivably instigate crimes which are already underway.
In addition, one may reason the IRS is simply using the court-approved crime
detection tools of deception and artifice.
An alternative conclusion is that since the Supreme Court cases all involve
entrapment, their holdings offer little guidance in assessing the BOP. Rochin,
however, is a reminder that there are limits on governmental conduct that are
quite unrelated to the entrapment problem. If the BOP methods "shock the
conscience" or are outrageous, they may violate due process principles. Because the fourth amendment cases clearly indicate government agents may
assume false identities to investigate criminal activity, it is unlikely that the
BOP could be considered so outrageous that it violates due process.
One further observation with respect to the Supreme Court pronounce93. 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
94. 411U.S. at431.
95. Id. at 431-32. In addition, despite a strong dissent, the Court again declined to
adopt the objective test of entrapment. Id. at 433.

96. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
97.
98.
99.

Id at 495.
ld. at 497.
Id. at 495-96 n.7.
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ments may be made. The Court condones infiltration and limited participation
in drug-related offenses because gathering evidence of such offenses otherwise
would be an "all but impossible task."' 100 If gathering evidence of tax evasion
is also an "all but impossible task," undercover operations in this context may
likewise be condoned. On the other hand, if alternative methods for discovering tax evasion exist, undercover operations may be inappropriate. In many
instances, the audit procedures and overt investigative tools of the IRS should
be sufficient to discover evidence of tax fraud; only if such routine procedures
do not suffice should the IRS resort to covert tactics.' 0 ' If evidence of skimming
is "all but impossible" to detect by routine methods, the BOP may be as
appropriate as the infiltration of drug rings. A review of lower court cases,
particularly those not involving entrapment and contraband, may aid in deciding whether this conclusion is warranted.
B. Due Processin the Lower Courts
A majority of the Justices in Hampton recognized that a due process defense, distinct from entrapment, still exists. The lower federal courts have
therefore heard many due process challenges and in most cases have rejected
due process claims of outrageous conduct. 10 2 This section examines due process
challenges in four types of cases involving contraband, staged arrests, Abscam,
and the IRS. The results strongly indicate a due process challenge against the
BOP will be unsuccessful.
1. Contraband Cases
One of the few post-Hampton cases in which the defendant's conviction was
reversed on due process grounds is United States v. Twigg.10s In Twigg, Drug
100. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
101. See generally H. BALTER, supranote 25, at §§ 5.02, 10.04[10], 13.03[4].
102. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United
States v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978); United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 538
F.2d 1359 (9th. Cir. 1976); United States v. Allen, 513 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Okla. 1981). See
also Cohn, The Need for an Objective Approach to ProsecutorialMisconduct, 46 BRooKLYN

L. REv 249, 254 (1980).
But see United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). In these two pre-Hampton cases, the due process challenges were
successful. In West, defendant's conviction for selling heroin was reversed because government agents were on both sides of the transaction. 511 F.2d at 1085. In Greene, the court
reversed the conviction because of the government's overinvolvement in defendants' bootlegging. 454 F.2d at 787. In light of Hampton, these results may be questionable; however,
Justice Powell cited Greene with apparent approval in his concurring opinion. 425 U.S. at
593 n.3.
103. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir, 1978). Kubica, a convicted felon who was cooperating with
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Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents planned a drug manufacturing laboratory and then brought the defendants, who did not have the expertise to
set up the laboratory themselves, into the operation. The court found the
police involvement "so overreaching" that it violated defendants' due process
rights as a matter of law.10 4 The police involvement was held to be far greater
than that in Russell where the government agent merely supplied Russell with
a bottle of a chemical ingredient. Moreover, the manufacturing enterprise and
Russell's participation in it began long before the government agent entered
the scene. In contrast, in Twigg, the criminal plan did not originate with
either of the defendants; instead, the DEA planned the venture before approaching the defendants and provided assistance after the defendants became involved.
Twigg may initially appear to contribute little to a due process analysis of
an IRS undercover operation. While it does demonstrate that a due process
challenge in the post-Hampton era can be successful, it involves both a contraband offense and the instigation of a crime. Of some significance, however, is
the court's analysis and application of Hampton to the facts in Twigg. In distinguishing between the sale of illegal drugs and the operation of an illicit
drug laboratory, the court observed that because the sale of drugs is a more
difficult crime to detect, it may require more extreme methods of investigation
than the manufacturing of drugs. 105 Twigg thus weighs the practical necessity
for a particular undercover tactic as a factor in the due process analysis.106
The Twigg court also pointed out that in determining whether government conduct is outrageous, a court must consider the tools available to the
government for combating the crime. 107 By analogy to the BOP, if the IRS
audit procedures are adequate for detecting skimming, then perhaps the BOP
is sufficiently "outrageous." The Twigg court, however, was concerned not
only with the necessity of setting up the laboratory, but also with the extreme
governmental overreaching. The BOP agents in Jones and Security Bank,
though, did not overreach; their only involvement in tax evasion was expressing an interest in purchasing businesses with skimming potential.108
DEA agents, suggested to Neville that they establish a "speed" laboratory. Neville then
brought Twigg into the operation. The government supplied some of the glassware and an
indispensable chemical ingredient, made arrangements for Kubica to purchase the remaining
ingredients, and provided the laboratory site. Kubica provided the laboratory expertise, as
neither defendant had the "know-how" to manufacture the speed. Id. at 388.
Twigg and Neville were arrested and convicted for their part in manufacturing
methamphetamine. On appeal, Neville raised the issue of entrapment, but the court allowed
the jury finding of predisposition to stand. The defense of entrapment was not even available to Twigg because he had not been brought into the enterprise by a government agent.
Id. at 376. Both defendants challenged their convictions on due process grounds.
104. Id. at 377.
105. Id. at 378.
106. See Gershman, supra note 83, at 616 (suggesting that the necessity for using an
undercover operation be one of several criteria in a due process analysis).
107. 588 F.2d at 378 n.6, citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495-96 n.7.

108. Another example of governmental overreaching resulting in a successful due
process claim is United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981). That
case did not deal with the factual issue of entrapment, because defendants filed a pretrial
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Therefore, if a successful due process challenge requires both overreaching
and an unnecessary undercover tactic, the BOP may not be found unconstitutional on due process grounds.
2. The Staged Arrest
While courts frequently hear claims stemming from contraband investigations, another type of undercover investigation has also been challenged as a
violation of due process -the simulated or "staged" arrest. 0 9 As part of an
investigation of corruption within the New York criminal justice system, an
undercover agent, Bario, was arrested on a phony charge and processed through
the criminal justice system in order to trap persons willing to fix a case.110 In
United States v. Archer,"' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether this governmental conduct violated due process. The court
did, however, express serious reservations about the staged arrest, finding it to
be substantially more offensive than the tactics used by undercover narcotics
agents."1 2 The court was thus signaling that some types of governmental demotion to dismiss solely on due process grounds. In granting the'motion, the court described this as "a case where the government ... went about putting persons in the business
of crime for the first time." Id. at 752. Not only did the government supply the drugs, but
defendants were not involved in a drug-related enterprise until an informant prompted
them to create one and enticed them with offers of legitimate and highly profitable business
ventures in which to invest the proceeds of the drug deal. The court likened this case to
Twigg, and concluded the governmental conduct had risen to that level of outrageousness
which violates due process principles. Id. at 752-53.
109. See generally Cohn, supra note 102, at 249; Gershman, supra note 83, at 567. Both
commentators analyzed the cases involving staged arrests. In his analysis of the entrapment
defense and due process limitations as applied to the staged arrest, Professor Gershman re
views case law concerning challenges to various types of undercover operations. See id. at
601-11. He suggests that "legal analysis directed at the staged arrest would be extremely
valuable in assessing the lawfulness of other types of creative and controversial law enforcement operation." Id. at 570 n.16.
110. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1973). A New York City police
officer, Murano, and the undercover agent, Bario, acted out the arrest at a diner and carried
out the booking procedures at the precinct house. Murano filed a complaint and arrest
affidavit falsely charging Bario with the unauthorized possession of two pistols. Another
undercover agent posed as Bario's father and posted bail after Bario's arraignment. Through
a middleman, Bario met defendants Wasserberger, a bondsman, and Klein, an attorney.
Klein agreed to arrange matters before the grand jury for a fee. Wasserberger indicated that
part of the $15,000 payment would go to the district attorney, Archer, who would present
the charge to the grand jury. Bario testified as he was instructed to by Klein, Archer aided
in eliciting the fabrication, and Murano testified in accordance with the complaint and
arrest affidavit. The grand jury returned no true bill. Later, searches of Archer's home and
Klein's safe deposit unearthed marked money. Id. at 672-74.
111. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). Defendants had been convicted of violating the
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982). The Second Circuit reversed the conviction because the
use of interstate telephone facilities to return phone calls to undercover agents'did not bring
the defendants within the Travel Act.
112. [T]he Government agents displayed an arrogant disregard for the sanctity of the
state judicial and police processes. While this pattern of deception may be less serious
than some forms pf governmental participation in crime that can be hypothesized, it
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ception are problematic, even when employed to detect crimes detrimental to
the public. Deception in the judicial system appears far more troubling than
deception by the IRS in private business settings.
On a petition for rehearing, the Archer court dismissed the federal charges
under the Travel Act." 3 Thereafter, Archer, the district attorney who aided in
eliciting the fabricated testimony in Bario's case was prosecuted and convicted in state court of receiving a bribe. 11 4 The state court concluded the
governmental conduct did not offend due process." 5 The court decided the
government did not manufacture a crime which otherwise would not have
occurred because Bario's defense attorney and Archer were apparently engaged in ongoing criminal activity prior to the staged arrest. In addition, the
court found the purpose of the staged arrest, to detect corruption in the criminal justice system, to be a proper one. Less offensive alternatives had been
considered and rejected, and attempts were made to limit the deception to the
minimum extent necessary. While suggesting that judicial guidelines might be
helpful, the court concluded that "the carefully selected use of the contrived
crime under appropriately compelling circumstances" is not a violation of
due process.' 6 Upon rehearing Archer's claim in his application for a writ of
habeas corpus, the Second Circuit agreed with the state court that the governmental conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to violate due process."1 7
is substantially more offensive than the common cases where government agents induce
the sale of narcotics in order to make drug arrests.
486 F.2d at 677.
113. Id. at 683. See supra note 111.
114. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979), af'd, 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406
N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
115. The state court analyzed the staged arrest in light of standards set forth in People
v. Isaacson. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). This case was based on
the due process clause of the New York Constitution. The Isaacson standards are as follows:
Illustrative of factors to be considered are: (1) whether the police manufactured a
crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves
in an ongoing criminal activity. . . .; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in
criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice ....
; (3) whether the
defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian
instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation or exorbitant gain, or by
persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness ....
(4) whether the record reveals
simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police motive is to
prevent further crime or protect the populace.
Id. at 521-22, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S. 2d at 719.
In Isaacson, an informant who was physically abused by the police and deceived about
the charges against him agreed to assist the police for a reduction in his sentence. He contacted Isaacson in Pennsylvania seven times, pleading that he needed a deal so that he could
hire an attorney and make bail. The informant contrived to get Isaacson into New York for
the sale and, there he was arrested. See id. at 514-18, 378 N.E.2d at 78-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
715-17. After applying the four factors, the court dismissed the indictment on due process
grounds. Id. at 525, 378 N.E.2d at 85. 406 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
116. 417 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
117. Archer v. Commissioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 851 (1981). The staged arrest technique continues to be utilized. The Justice Department
has apparently used undercover agents to detect case fixing and bribery in the Cook County.
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That a staged arrest case can be constitutionally valid dearly signals that
undercover operations involving crimes other than contraband offenses can
fall within the limits imposed by due process. The state court's concern with
the absence of less offensive alternatives in Archer is consistent with the Twigg
court's emphasis on the availability of other tools for the law enforcement
agencies. In addition, the Archer state court stressed that the deception was
minimized. The deceptions in the BOP cases, even if they were not kept at an
absolute minimum, were not as offensive nor as extensive as the deceptions
practiced upon the grand jury process in Archer. If the staged arrest in Archer
was not "outrageous," then the BOP should likewise not be considered "outrageous."
3. Abscam
l8

was orchestrated by FBI agents working with a
The Abscam operation
middleman, Melvin Weinberg, a "con man" who agreed to cooperate with the
FBI in return for a sentence of probation for a mail fraud conviction. 1 9 The
undercover operation went through three phases: first, a traditional sting
operation focused on the recovery of stolen securities and artwork; next, an
operation focused on local political corruption; and finally, an operation concentrated on exposing political corruption in Congress. ° Weinberg and the
agents set up a fictitious business known as "Abdul Enterprises" which was
financed by two wealthy Arab sheiks looking for investments. Word soon
spread that "big money" was available for those who would be willing to use

their influence with the government in immigration and other matters on
behalf of the sheiks. At monitored and videotaped meetings, cash payoffs were
made by undercover agents to two members of the Philadelphia city council,
an immigration official, six members of the House of Representatives, and a
United States Senator.' 2' Indictments soon followed for offenses related to
corruption of public office.
In United States v. Myers,12 2 the district court held a post trial hearing to
consider defendants' due process claims.123 Noting that the mere instigation of
Illinois, judicial system. Even a judge, wearing a tape recorder in his boots, has served as an
undercover agent for three years. See Green, 'Hillbilly' Judge Stars in Chicago Courtroom

Sting, L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
118. See generally Gershman, Abscam the Judiciary, and Ethics of Entrapment, 94 YArI
L.J. 1565 (1982); Note, ABSCAM: Time for the United States Supreme Court to Clarify the

Due Process Defense, 16 IND. L. REv. 581 (1983). These commentators review the Abscam
cases to date, particularly with respect to the entrapment and due process issues.
119. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983).
120. American Civil Liberties Union, THE LzssoNs or ABSCAm (Oct. 10, 1982) at 9.
121. 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983).
122. Id.
123. To assess the propriety of the government's conduct, the district court began by
discussing entrapment. Only one of the six defendants, Lederer, had raised the defense of
entrapment at trial, but the others attempted to raise a legal defense at the. post-trial hearing
based on entrapment as a matter of law or objective entrapment. Id. at 1217-18. After reviewing the Supreme Court precedents concerning entrapment, the court generally embraced
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a crime does not constitute outrageousness, the court concluded that the offer of
bribes by the undercover agents fell far short of outrageous conduct. In the
court's view, the defendants could simply have refused the bribes.124 Likewise,
the procedure for targeting officials was not improper; the Constitution does
not require probable cause before a person can be the subject of an undercover sting.12 5 The court's observation regarding targeting is relevant to an
analysis of the BOP. If no threshold requirement exists for targeting the subjects of an undercover operation, then, apparently, government agents may
randomly investigate the honesty of unwitting citizens. 12 6

The court also noted the vital necessity of this type of investigative tactic
in evaluating governmental conduct. 127 Bribery of public officials, unlike drug
trafficking, is not a continuing, illegal business enterprise; therefore, it may be
even more difficult to detect than drug deals. Since bribery involves no contraband, quick money exchanges might never be detected without infiltrating
tactics. Difficulty of detection alone may not justify an undercover operation.
Yet, when it is combined with the serious dangers posed to society by corruption in its public officials undercover tactics may be justified.128 With respect
to the BOP, skimming may sometimes be difficult to detect; however, tax
evasion does not pose a danger to society comparable to that presented by
corrupt public officials.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the governmental participation
in the criminal conduct did not breach due process limitations.129 For example,
the size of the inducement, offers of multi-million dollar projects in the
Congressmen's districts, was not so coercive as to violate due process.
Whatever conduct might transgress the standard outlined in Hampton
and Russell, the facts of the Abscam investigation are not even close to
the line.... The bare suggestion to a Congressman that he take a bribe,
even for a promise he need only pretend to make, surely does not violate
a constitutional standard of "outrageous" behavior. The public has the
right to expect that their public officials have sufficient integrity not to
capitulate at such a suggestion. 130
The BOP methods which did not involve inducements were likewise not
coercive. The Joneses readily displayed the documentation of their skim, and
Mrs. Gammel openly discussed methods of skimming with the agents. In a
sense, they "capitulated" to the requests of the BOP agents. Honest taxpayers
the subjective view of entrapment, subject to an overriding exception that a predisposed
defendant cannot be convicted if police overinvolvement in his crime reaches a demonstratable
level of outrageousness. Id. at 1222. The court's rejection of objective entrapment obviated all
defendants' claims based on that doctrine. The court next turned to defendants' argument
that the government's conduct was "outrageousness."
124. Id. at 1225.
125. Id. at 1226-27. The court viewed each defendant as a willing volunteer seeking
illegal payments.
126. See Gershman, supra note 118, at 1584.

127.
128.
129.
130.

527 F. Supp. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
692 F.2d at 837-42.
Id. at 843.
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would have no such hidden data to reveal, nor would they sell the "skim" as
an asset of their business.
A second Abscam case, United States v. Williams,'3 involved transactions
even more complex than the cash bribes in Myers. Defendants, who held
financial interests in a titanium mine and processing plant, agreed to use
Senator Williams' influence to obtain government contracts for the purchase
of titanium if the Arab sheik would provide financing for the titanium operation. 13 2 Following their convictions, defendants filed motions to dismiss their
indictments. The district court rejected the defendants' due process claims,'3
and the Second Circuit affirmed. 4
While finding several similarities to Myers, the Second Circuit emphasized
one key difference between the two sting operations. In Williams, the titanium
financing was initially discussed in connection with an apparently legitimate
business transaction. The court was concerned that "the subtle shifting of a
legitimate proposal into an unlawful one" could create risks of incorrect factfinding; however, the clarity of the evidence in this case obviated any risk of
factual error.135 Similarly, the BOP agents initially discussed legitimate business transactions with the taxpayers, and then shifted their proposals to purchases of businesses with potential for skimming. Of course, the Williams court
was concerned with the presentation of a criminal opportunity to a target. 36
The BOP agents, however, were not presenting a criminal opportunity but
instead were seeking evidence of past criminal acts. The BOP shift away from
a legitimate business proposal to one involving skimming did not involve the
risk of inaccurate factfinding suggested in Williams.'3'
131. 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 1090-91.
133. Id. at 1107.
134. 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983). The district court had heard a series of due process
claims, based on such misconduct as the coaching of Williams, timed interruptions of
Williams' monitored conversations, and the amount of the inducement. The court rejected
the claim that any of this governmental conduct was at a "demonstrable level of outrageousness." 529 F. Supp. at 1102. The court likewise found that Williams was not subject
to selective prosecution, and that an internal FBI memorandum assessing the weakness of
the case against Williams, prior to the end of the investigation, reflected nothing improper.
Id. at 1100. Defendants were really urging the court to adopt an objective view of entrapment, and the court declined to do so. Id. at 1094. In addition, although the "coaching" by
Weinberg and the size of the inducements distinguished this case from the Abscam scenario
in Myers, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that either the coaching or the size of
the inducements constituted "outrageous" conduct. 705 F.2d at 6g0.
135. 705 F.2d at 621.
136. Id.
137. In United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), the Second Circuit considered another Abscam ploy. In that case, an official with the Immigration and Naturalization Service was convicted of bribery, conspiracy, and conflict of interest for agreeing to
obtain a "green card" for a friend of the Abscam sheik in exchange for a fee. Noting that
the investigative techniques used to obtain evidence of Alexandro's activities involved
neither bodily invasion, as in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), nor coercion, as in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), the court rejected Alexandro's claim of a due process
violation. 675 F.2d at 35-36.
The court also compared Alexandro's case to the staged arrest scenario in Archer v. Com-
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Due process challenges in two other Abscam cases met more success, but
only at the district court level. In United States v. Jannotti,13s the district
court acquitted defendants in part on due process grounds. 139 In an en banc
opinion, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, rejecting the defendants'
claims of entrapment and overreaching.1 40 The court also rejected the arguments that this phase of Abscam was outrageous because there was no reasonable basis to believe such tactics would unearth crime. Following the Myers
reasoning, the court noted there is no constitutional requirement of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause before an undercover operation can begin.' 41
missioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981). As extensive
as the tactics were in Archer, they still did not violate the due process clause. 675 F.2d at 41.
Here, Alexandro had readily agreed to participate in the illicit scheme to obtain the immigration documents and had devised his own plan. Thus, the investigation of Alexandro,
far less extensive than that in Archer, was clearly not in violation of the Constitution. Id.
138. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,

457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
139. 501 F. Supp. at 1205. Schwartz, president of the Philadelphia City Council, and
Jannotti, a city council member, accepted bribes from the fictitious sheik, who was supposedly interested in building a hotel complex in Philadelphia. The district court noted that
Schwartz may have only been rendering advice in exchange for a consulting fee, or both
defendants may have accepted money simply to assure the sheik he had influential friends,
in accordance with the "Arab way of doing business." Id. at 1194-98. The court found entrapment as a matter of law, because defendants were not predisposed to commit the crime suggested by the government agents. Id. at 1205. Although ready acquiescence to the govern-

ment's suggestion sometimes constitutes predisposition, such a conclusion was precluded
here because of the amount of the inducement, the fact that defendants were not asked to
do anything improper, and their belief Philadelphia would lose the hotel project if they
did not accept the money. The court stated: "[W]hat the Government succeeded in proving,
was, not that the defendants were corrupt city officials, but that, exposed to strong temptation, they could be rendered corrupt." Id. at 1200.
While the court concluded defendants were entitled to an acquittal on the entrapment
defense, it alternatively held the acquittal could be based on governmental overreaching in
violation of due process. Id. at 1205. In comparison to Twigg, the court found this case a
stronger one for dismissal because of the government's excessive creative involvement in the
crime. Although it would be permissible to set up an undercover business entity and await
overtures by public officials, or perhaps even initiate bribe proposals, it was inappropriate
for the undercover agents to couple the bribe offers with large financial inducements and
what amounted to appeals to civic duty. Id. at 1204. Thus, the same governmental conduct
that amounted to entrapment as a matter of law also constituted a violation of due process.
140. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982). With respect to the entrapment issue, the majority
opinion stated the district court impermissibly substituted its determination for that of the
jury, as there was evidence to support the jury's findings. The court also held that a successful due process defense must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which goes
beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense. "We must be careful not to undermine the Court's consistent rejection of the objective test of entrapment by permitting it to
reemerge cloaked as a due process defense." Id. a 608. The court reasoned that if the nature
of the inducements did not negate the evidence of predisposition as a matter of law, they
could not have been so overreaching as to violate due process. The court distinguishea rwigg
by observing that the FBI provided neither materials nor assistance to defendants, out instead sought to buy the influence defendants already possessed.
141. Id. at 609. The dissenting opinion of Judge Aldisert focused on the entrapment
question and agreed with the district court that the government failed to present sufficient
evidence of predisposition to submit the matter to the jury. Id. at 631 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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. As in Jannotti, the district court found a due -process violation in United
States v. Kelly.42 Prior to Congressman Kelly's meeting with the undercover
agents, the middleman indicated Kelly would not accept the sheiks' bribe, and
thus no money should be offered. An agent nonetheless proposed a payment at
the meeting. Kelly responded that he was there to discuss investments in his
district. The agent persisted and Kelly finally accepted $25,000 as the initial
43
payment of a $100,000 bribe.

The district court was concerned that the Abscam investigation was initiated when "no one in the government had even the remotest suspicion about
the existence of any prior, ongoing, or imminent criminal activity."' 44 The
court also found objectionable the repeated attempts to bribe Congressman
Kelly. In the court's view, the government should have ceased testing Kelly
when it first became aware he would reject the bribe. "A suspicion free subject
should be exempted from further testing on the basis of winning the first battle
against temptation."' 45 The court considered it unlikely that anyone other
than an undercover agent would repeatedly attempt to corrupt an official because both offering and receiving a bribe is a criminal offense.' 46 In a per
curiam decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found no due process violation and reversed the district court's order. In a
separate opinion, one judge concluded the fundamental fairness guarantee of
the due process clause is not violated absent coercion, violence, or brutality,
47
and the court below was not free to adopt a new definition of outrageousness.
In summary, no federal appellate court held Abscam so outrageous as to
violate due process. Compared to Abscam, the BOP certainly appears no more
outrageous; indeed, it would seem even less so. Absent from the BOP are the
problems stemming from possible entrapment, the questionable inducements,
and the use of corrupt middlemen with questionable motives. Significantly,
though, Abscam was designed to detect a crime almost undiscoverable other
than by means of an undercover operation. The Abscam cases thus reflect that
a showing of necessity for the undercover tactics is a primary judicial concern,
even if it is not explicitly identified as an essential factor in a due process
4s
analysis.2
142. 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 264 (1983).
143. Id. at 370.
144. Id. at 371.
145. Id. at 376.
146. In a similar sense, the BOP agents made repeated attempts to "test" the taxpayers'
honesty. However, they were not tempting the taxpayers to commit new crimes, but only to
reveal previously committed crimes.
147. 707 F.2d 1460, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).

148. In both Jones and Security Bank, the courts referred to the "necessity of undercover
work," although not in the context of a due process analysis. The Jones district court asserted:
Mhe unique nature and function of the IRS bears upon the question of the necessity
for or value of undercover activities by IRS agents. Specifically, the value and necessity
of the BOP is minimized to the extent that the continued operation of the project
would interfere with the IRS's reliance oil voluntary assessment and compliance by

taxpayers.
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If an undercover operation is the only tool available to the IRS for gathering evidence of skimming, then the requisite showing of necessity is probably
present. However, the necessity for an undercover operation stems not only
from the difficulty of detection but also from the nature of the criminal activity. As stated in Myers, corruption in public officials poses such a serious danger
to society that undercover tactics are justified. Whether tax evasion poses a
comparable danger is questionable. The Jones district court determined that
tax evasion does not present a threat to public health and welfare. Comparing
the detection of tax evasion to the detection of contraband, the Jones court
apparently concluded undercover tactics were appropriate only to detect
tangible items posing such a risk. Both the staged arrest cases and the Abscam
cases, though, refute the notion that undercover operations must have such a
limited focus to be constitutionally acceptable. As noted in Security Bank, tax
evasion causes great public ]oss. Tax evasion may not directly or immediately
affect public health and welfare, but substantial losses in revenue will eventually hinder the proper functioning of government. Thus, while the threat
may not be equal in magnitude to that posed by either corruption or contraband offenses, tax evasion can detrimentally affect society.
Undercover tactics may therefore be necessary and constitutionally acceptable in the tax offense context. Unless IRS investigations are subject to
different constitutional constraints than those applicable to other criminal
investigations, a position advocated only by the Jones district court, the BOP
appears no more outrageous than the operations conducted by the FBI or
other law enforcement agencies. An examination of judicial challenges to two
very different types of IRS investigations reveals that tax enforcement cases
are, in fact, governed by the same due process standards applied in other law
enforcement cases.
4. IRS Gases
In United States v. Bocra,149 defendant was convicted of bribing an IRS
524 F. Supp. at 652. In contrast, the Security Bank court stated:
It is clear that other agencies of the government, such as the Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration and even Fish and Wildlife sometimes employ undercover methods, including having agents posing as prospective
purchasers of items. Although "sting" type projects have inherent in them certain
problems, including evidentiary ones, in many circumstances they may be the government's only method of discovering certain kinds of information regarding possible
crimes.
82-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9588 at 85,119.
149. 625 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1980). In the course of an audit of two companies owned by
the Bocra family, Arthur Lemp, the IRS agent assigned to the case, developed a personal
relationship with the family and the company accountant. This relationship included lunches
with William Bocra, appellant, and Theodore Bocra, his brother. Lemp claimed the Bocras
requested him to go easy on them, but the Bocras denied this. Lemp notified the IRS Inspection Service after receiving a dinner invitation and continued to accept invitations in
order to monitor any bribe attempts. Wearing a concealed tape recorder to the dinner, Lemp
and William Bocra took an after-dinner stroll and arranged the bribe. Id. at 283-84.
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agent. On appeal; the defendant argued that the agent pirposely delayed the

audit and subtly suggested the possibility of favorable tax treatment in exchange for a price. While the court expressed some concern with the agent's
conduct,1 0 it nevertheless concluded that under Twigg the agent's behavior

was not so outrageous as to bar defendant's conviction on due process grounds.
Faced with an IRS investigation of bribery, this court, like most courts faced
with a due process challenge to governmental investigations, articulated its
disapproval of the agent's methods but found them constitutionally acceptable.
By using Twigg as a measure for assessing egregiousness, the court was clearly
applying the same due process standards applicable to contraband cases.
United States v. Paynerlsl also applied traditional due process standards to
an IRS operation. Payner was indicted for falsely stating on his tax return
that he had no foreign bank accounts. 1 5 2 The evidence against Payner was obtained when an IRS informant surreptitiously entered an apartment and
photographed documents from a briefcase belonging to a bank officer. The
documents indicated Payner had a bank account in the Bahamas.2ss
Payner filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing the search of the
briefcase violated the fourth amendment. The district court, however, held he
lacked standing to assert the bank officer's fourth amendment rights. Payner
also alleged a due process violation. Applying various due process cases, the
court reasoned that evidence obtained by government officials "engaging in
At trial, Bocra raised the defense of entrapment. Bocra contended Lemp set him up by
developing a personal relationship and by making overtures indicating his interest in a bribe.
Lemp countered that Bocra's free lunches and requests for favorable tax treatment indicated
Bocra's predisposition. The jury apparently rejected Bocra's version of the facts. Id. at 289.
150. There is no justification for the development of a first-name relationship with
the taxpayer in the course of an audit and the social involvement of the distaff side of
the agent's and taxpayer's families to create an ambience which subjects even the
honest taxpayer to unnecessary temptation. The agent's duty is to conduct his audit
promptly, efficiently, and fairly, not to probe the lack or strength of the taxpayer's
character.
Id. at 290.
151. 434 F. Supp. 113 (NMD. Ohio 1977), aJJ'd, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S.
727 (1980).
152. id. at 117. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1948), knowingly and willfully

making a false statement within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States. Id.
153. In 1972, the IRS suspected the Castle Bank in the Bahamas was functioning as an
illegal tax haven for Americans. Special Agent Jaffe met with an informant, Norman Casper,
and asked him to obtain the names and addresses of individuals with accounts at Castle
Bank. Casper devised a plan, which was approved by Jaffe and his superior. Casper had
learned that an officer of the Castle Bank was traveling to the United States with some bank
records in his briefcase. Upon his arrival, the officer went to the apartment of Sybol Kennedy,
a private detective whom Casper had previously introduced to the officer. When he and
Kennedy went out to dinner, Casper entered the apartment with a key furnished by Kennedy,
removed the briefcase, and had the contents photographed. The briefcase and documents
were returned to the apartment before Kennedy and the bank officer returned from dinner.
434 F. Supp. at 118-20. Within two weeks, Casper sent Kennedy to the Bahamas, where she
stole a rolodex file from the bank office. Casper earned $8,000 from the IRS for his role in
the "caper"; Kennedy received $1,000 from Casper. Id. at 120.
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illegal conduct which exhibits their knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility
to any person's fundamental constitutional rights" should be suppressed. 5 4
Although the court recognized the governmental interest in apprehending tax
evaders and the wide latitude permitted the IRS in civil tax litigation, it
rejected the notion that the government's taxing interest outweighs fundamental interests protected by the Constitution. This reasoning is significant
because it indicates that IRS investigations are bound by the same constitutional strictures as other criminal investigations. Payner thus undercuts the
Jones district court's position that IRS undercover operations require a different constitutional analysis than other types of undercover operations.
The court ultimately ordered the evidence suppressed, not only on due
process grounds but also under the court's inherent supervisory powers. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed on the latter ground, but did not reach the constitutional questions. 155 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, concluding that
the lower court's supervisory powers did not permit the suppression of evidence
seized unlawfully from a third party. 15 The due process issue was not raised
before the Supreme Court, but the Court's references to it did not negate the
proposition that traditional due process standards govern IRS undercover
operations.
Thus, the fifth amendment constraints on governmental conduct apply to
the IRS as they apply to any government agency investigating criminal activity. The BOP appears to comply with the due process principles of fundamental fairness. Even if one is disturbed by the idea of IRS agents assuming
undercover identities in legitimate business settings, such conduct does not
rise to the "demonstrable level of outrageousness" which violates due process.
While the BOP may be challenged on the grounds that alternative investigative tools are available to detect skimming, a lack of necessity for the undercover tactic may alone be insufficient to characterize the BOP as outrageous.
Moreover, if routine audit techniques are impractical for detecting skimming
in certain types of cash businesses, a fifth amendment challenge to the BOP
will surely fail.
IV.

STATUTORY SAFEGUARDS FOR UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

This article demonstrates that neither the fourth amendment nor the due
process provision of the fifth amendment restricts the IRS from conducting
an undercover operation such as the Business Opportunities Project. Yet, the
notion of IRS undercover agents participating in legitimate business transactions is troubling and appropriate limits on such operations should be considered. Contrary to the Jones district court, this article concludes IRS undercover operations are governed by the same constitutional standards pertaining
154. 434 F. Supp. at 129. The IRS at that time counseled its agents that the fourth
amendment allowed them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search in order to
gain evidence against third parties. The court found this purposeful behavior outrageous,
and in violation of both the Constitution and Florida criminal law.

155. 590 F.2d at 207.
156. 447 U.S. at 735.
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to FBI undercover operations. The limits imposed on FBI investigations therefore should be imposed on IRS investigations.
Commentators have suggested that the fourth and fifth amendments might
be interpreted as imposing a warrant requirement on certain types of undercover operations. 157 Moreover, public reaction to the Abscam investigations
has sparked new interest in imposing possible limitations on undercover
operations. 158 After studying Abscam in depth, the Senate Select Committee to
Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice suggested legislative reforms in its final report. 5 Included in the proposed legislation are threshold requirements for the initiation of undercover operations.6 0
157. See Gershman, supra note 83, at 633. The author suggests the use of a staged arrest
warrant, perhaps statutorily imposed, based on criteria derived from the fifth amendment
due process standards. See also Stone, supra note 65, at 1252. The author suggests that, with
some exceptions, the use of secret agents "to deceive individuals into revealing information
about themselves" be included in the Fourth Amendment's coverage and subject to its

warrant requirement.
158. See Gershman, supra note 118 (statutory proposal regarding entrapment); American
Civil Liberties Union, supra note 120 (recommends legislative reforms, including a judicial

warrant requirement for undercover operations).
159. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. These suggestions are now embodied in a Senate bill.
S.804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CONG. R c. S2797-52801 (1983). The proposed legislation has
six parts:
(1) authorization for undercover operations;
(2) limited exemption of undercover operations from certain legal restrictions;
(3) administrative guidelines and reporting requirements;
(4) prohibited undercover operations (threshold requirements);
(5) compensation for injuries;
(6) statutory entrapment defense.
Id. at S2799.
160. Section 3803. Limits on undercover operations; standards for selecting targets.
(a) No law enforcement component of the Department of Justice may initiate, maintain, expand, extend, or xenew an undercover operation except in accordance with the
following standards:
(1) When the operation is intended to obtain information about an identified individual, or to result in the offer to an identified individual of an opportunity to engage in a criminal act, there shall be a finding that there is reasonable suspicion that
the individual has engaged, is engaging, or is likely to engage in criimnal activity.
(2) When the operation is intended to obtain information about particular specified
types of criminal acts, or generally to offer unspecified persons an opportunity or inducement to engage in criminal acts, there shall be a finding that there is reasonable
suspicion that the operation will detect past, ongoing, or planned criminal activity
of that specified type. If, during the course of such an operation, agents of the law enforcement component wish to offer to a specific individual who is identified in advance
of the offer an inducement to engage in a criminal act, they may do so only upon a
finding that there is reasonable suspicion that the targeted individual has engaged, is
engaging, or is likely to engage in criminal activity.
(3) When a Government agent, informant, or cooperating individual will infiltrate
any political, governmental, religious, or news media organization or entity, there shall
be a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the operation is necessary to
detect or to prevent specific acts of criminality.
(4) When a Government agent, informant, or cooperating individual will pose as an
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attorney, physician, clergyman, or member of the news media, and there is a significant
risk that another individual will enter into a confidential relationship with that person,
there shall be a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the operation is
necessary to detect or prevent specific acts of criminality.
(B) All findings required to be made by subsection (a) shall be made by the Undercover Operations Review Committee for the appropriate law enforcement component,
following procedures to be specified in the guidelines for such component which have
been promulgated pursuant to this chapter. However, such guidelines may authorize
findings of reasonable suspicion, as required by subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), to be made
by the head of the field office in charge, following procedures specified in such guidelines, if such a finding of reasonable suspicion is accompanied by a finding that none
of the following circumstances are present or can reasonably be expected to materialize
during the course of the undercover operation:
(1) the undercover operation will involve an investigation of possible corrupt action
by a public official or political candidate, the activities of a foreign government, the
activities of a religious or political organization, or the activities of the news media;
(2) the undercover operation will involve untrue representations by an undercover
employee or cooperating private individual concerning the activities or involvement of
an innocent person;
(3) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will engage in any
activity that is proscribed by Federal, State, or local law as a felony or that is otherwise
a serious crime except for activity involving criminal liability for the purchase of stolen
or contraband goods or for the making of false representations to third parties in concealment of personal identity or the true ownership of a proprietary;
(4) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will seek to supply
an item or service that would be reasonably unavailable to criminal actors but for the
participation of the government;
(5) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will run a significant
risk of being arrested and seeking to continue in an undercover capacity;
(6) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will be required to
give sworn testimony in any proceeding in an undercover capacity;
(7) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will attend a meeting
between a subject of the investigation and his lawyer;
(8) an undercover employee or cooperating private individual will pose as an attorney, physician, clergyman, or member of the news media, and there is a significant
risk that another individual will be led into a professional or confidential relationship
with the undercover employee or cooperating private individual as a result of the pose;
(9) a request for information will be made by an undercover employee or cooperating individual to an attorney, physician, clergyman, or other person who is under the
obligation of a legal privilege of confidentiality, and the particular information would
ordinarily be privileged;
(10) a request for information will be made by an undercover employee or cooperating private individual to a member of the news media concerning any individual with
whom the newsman is known to have a professional or confidential relationship;
(11) the undercover operation will be used to infiltrate a group under investigation
as part of a Domestic Security Investigation, or to recruit a person from within such a
group as an informant; and
(12) there may be a significant risk of violence or physical injury to individuals or a
significant risk of financial loss to an innocent individual.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b), the guidelines for a law enforcement component may provide that, when (1) the initiation, expansion, extension, or renewal of an undercover operation is
necessary to protect life or to prevent other serious harm; and
(2) exigent circumstances make it impossible, before the harm is likely to occur, to
obtain the authorization that would otherwise be required, the head of the field office
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The Select Committee recognized that undercover operations can significantly
invade legitimate privacy interests;1 ' accordingly the Senate bill proposes that
undercover operations shall be initiated only in accordance with the following
rules:
(1) When the operation is intended to obtain information about an
identified individual .... there shall be a finding that there is reasonable
suspicion that the individual has engaged, is engaging, or is likely to
engage in criminal activity.
(2) When the operation is intended to obtain information about parthere shall be a finding that
ticular specified types of criminal acts ....
past, onthere is reasonable suspicion that the operation will detect
0 2
going, or planned criminal activity of that specified type.While advocating this statutorily imposed threshold of "reasonable suspicion," the Committee rejected a judicial warrant requirement for undercover operations. Although it found the arguments in favor of a warrant requirement "compelling,"' 65 the Committee nevertheless concluded that presently the drawbacks of requiring a warrant outweigh the advantages.8 4 Although the IRS was not within the scope of the Select Committee's study, the
in charge may approve the operation upon his finding that the applicable requirements
of subsection (a) have been met. A written application for approval must then be
forwarded, together with the initial finding and a written description of the exigent
circumstances, to the appropriate Undercover Operations Review Committee at the
earliest possible opportunity, and in any event within 48 hours of the initiation, expansion, extension, or renewal of the operation. If the subsequent written application
for approval is denied, a full written report of all activity undertaken during the
course of the operation must be submitted to head of the component and to the Attorney General.
(d) All findings required to be made by this section shall be made in writing, and
shall include a statement of the specific facts or circumstances upon which the finding
is based.
(e) Failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not provide a defense
in any criminal prosecution or create any civil claim for relief.
S.804, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 129, CONG. REc. S2798-2799 (1983).
161. FINAL REPORT, supranote 3, at 381.
162. S.804, supra note 160, § 3803(a) at S2798. The statutory proposal does not create a
remedy for a government agency's failure to meet the threshold requirement. Indeed, the bill
provides that "[flailure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not provide a
defense in any criminal prosecution or create any civil claim for relief." Id. at S2799. Although
the other sections of the proposed legislation should aid in monitoring undercover techniques, the threshold requirement contains no sanction for its violation. The Select Committee's report did indicate that a warrant mechanism might be imposed in the future, if
the "law enforcement agencies are unable or unwilling to regulate themselves effectively."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 389.

A remedy should be provided for a violation of the proposed statutory requirements, even
if the statute does not include a warrant mechanism. An investigation carried out in violation of the statutory requirements could result in the suppression of evidence tainted by the
investigation or, in a civil action, for damages by persons aggrieved by the investigation.
While a warrant requirement might be the most powerful device for screening out inappropriate undercover operations, alternative remedies should be given consideration.
163. FINAL REPORT, supranote 3, at 387.
164. Id. at 389. The Committee terms this conclusion "conditional."
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Committee report used IRS activities as examples to illustrate the need for a
thorough study of undercover operations. 16 5 The Committee at least implied
that IRS undercover operations also need regulation.16
A threshold requirement. of reasonable suspicion should apply to IRS
undercover operations. Undercover investigations may be a necessary tax
enforcement tool, but they also may be highly intrusive. Even letters and
phone calls from IRS agents posing as private businessmen intrude upon the
privacy of innocent people; moreover, personal meeting, tours, and business
negotiations may reveal a variety of personal information to government
agents.
To protect innocent individuals from such highly intrusive honesty tests,
undercover operations should be directed only at those individuals suspected
of tax evasion. 16 7 While the Abscam cases indicate such a threshold is not constitutionally mandated in undercover operations, it could be statutorily imposed. A statutory threshold requirement would better assure the public that
the IRS is not randomly subjecting innocent individuals to intrusive encounters with undercover agents. Imposing such a threshold may also deter the
IRS from using undercover operations when alternative techniques would
suffice.
Although the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion would limit
the situations in which undercover operations could be initiated, it would not
bar such operations. Indeed, in his approval of the BOP, the National Director
of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division (then the Intelligence Division),
articulated two conditions which appear comparable to the reasonable suspicion threshold:
At the very least, before an agent contacts a business seller, we should
have a reasonable basis to believe that the taxpayer offering the business
for sale has understated the reported net profit of the business. Also, the
165.

The Committee gave the following example:

Also, on November 7, 1982, The Washington Post reported that the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") is vastly expanding its intelligence and undercover activities and has
created a special intelligence unit with unprecedented powers ....
In addition, it is
stepping up not only "sting" operations but also the use of undercover agents posing
as businessmen....
Id. at 6 n.20.
166. Senator Mathias, anticipating some revisions in the proposed legislation, stated:
Finally, tle bill is applicable only to the Department of Justice and its subagencies.
Other Federal law enforcement agencies like the Internal Revenue Service, the Secret
Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, are not touched by this
bill - except for the entrapment defense - even though the same potential for abuse
exists in their operations.
Id. at S2801.

167. The reasonable suspicion standard is comparable to "the level of knowledge that
permits a police officer constitutionally to stop and question a person on a public street."
Gershman, supra note 118, at 1589, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968). Professor
Gershman suggests the reasonable suspicion standard be incorporated in a statute governing
entrapment. See also Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
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[tax] returns of the business do not reflect a realistic picture of income
when compared with the asking (selling) price. [sic] 68
In Jones, however, the IRS special agents failed to meet those conditions until
after the investigation had begun.169 The Security Bank opinion does not
clearly reveal whether the National Director's two conditions were met. 70 A
statutorily imposed threshold showing would have assured that such BOP
operations were justified by a reasonable suspicion that skimming would be
detected.
V.

CONCLUSION

Neither the fourth amendment nor the due process clause of the fifth
amendment prohibits the IRS Business Opportunities Project as described in
Jones and Security Bank. The recent statutory proposal' 7 1 is a first step in
fashioning limited controls over intrusive undercover operations. Imposing a
comparable statutory threshold on IRS undercover operations would, consistent with the spirit of Jones, safeguard against the inappropriate use of
undercover methods. At the same time, it would, consistent with the spirit of
Security Bank, condone the use of undercover operations which are justified
by a specific factual setting. Decisions to utilize undercover operations would
therefore properly balance individual privacy rights with governmental needs
for efficient detection of tax evasion.
168. 722 F.2d at 445 n.2.
169. Id. at 445-46. The agent's initial conversation with the business broker may have
provided a small part of the necessary factual basis for targeting the Joneses. However, the
case reflects no factual basis to justify the initial encounter with Bornstein. Under the proposed statute, even the initial encounter with Bornstein would have had to meet the second
rule, which applies to "operations that are not aimed at previously identified individuals."
FINAL R.EPORT, supranote 3, at 384.
170. Since the Security Bank operation began with the mailing of letters to brothel
owners, it too would have had to meet the second rule in the initial stages of the operation.
However, the decision does not reveal whether such a threshold showing was met.
171. This article does not discuss the other section of the proposed "Undercover Operations Act of 1983" because they do not deal specifically with the issues raised by the BOP
cases. Nevertheless, if Congress choose to formulate legislation governing IRS undercover
operations, it may wish to incorporate provisions similar to these other sections. On May 19,
1984, the IRS issued new guidelines of undercover operations. See 6 Internal Revenue Manual -Administration, pt. IX Intelligence (CCH) §§ 9383.11, 9383.2 to 9383.3. The new rules
are described as similar to those used by the FBI and as incorporating other restrictions from
the proposed Senate bill. See N.Y. Times, May 31, 1984, at 11, col. 1,
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